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CONDITIONALITY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
 
FELIX B. CHANG †   
 
The burgeoning field of Critical Romani Studies explores the 
persistent subjugation of Europe’s largest minority, the Roma. Within 
this field, it has become fashionable to draw parallels to the U.S. Civil 
Rights Movement.1 Yet the comparisons are often one-sided; lessons 
tend to flow from Civil Rights to Roma Rights more than the other 
way around. It is an all-too-common hagiography of Civil Rights, 
where our history becomes a blueprint for other movements for racial 
equality. 
To correct this trend, this Essay reveals what American 
scholars can learn from Roma Rights. Specifically, this Essay argues 
that the European Union’s Roma integration policies illuminate a 
relatively unexplored dynamic of America’s post-Civil War 
Reconstruction: the influence of the Reconstruction Act of 1867 upon 
the Fifteenth Amendment. The Reconstruction Act imposed 
conditions upon the readmission of former Confederate states that 
were out of step with laws governing incumbent states within the 
Union. Most prominently, Southern states had to uphold the suffrage 
rights of freedmen, even though Northern states denied African-
Americans the vote at almost every opportunity. Similarly, when the 
European Union (“EU”) expanded into post-Communist Eastern 
Europe, the Union required that accession candidates adopt minority  
 † Professor, University of Cincinnati College of Law. E-mail: 
felix.chang@uc.edu. I thank Rebecca Zietlow and Chris Bryant for their insightful 
comments. This article benefitted from presentations at Central European 
University, Duke, University of Wisconsin, and University of Toledo. 
 
1 See, e.g., James A. Goldston, The Unfulfilled Promise of Educational 
Opportunity in the United States and Europe: From Brown v. Board to D.H. and 
Beyond, in REALIZING ROMA RIGHTS (Jacqueline Bhabha et al. eds., 2017). 
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protections that were stricter than the obligations of incumbent 
members. 
This Essay begins by framing the readmission of ex-
Confederate states as conditionality, the process of negotiation over 
conditions for membership. Conditionality is closely associated with 
the eastern enlargement of the EU, another federal system that 
demanded more of candidates than of members. At times, the 
conditions for readmission and accession elevated the racial equality 
standards for all states. The U.S. appeared to pass the Fifteenth 
Amendment, for example, which guarantees the vote to all male 
citizens, to put to rest the uneven imposition of suffrage.2 Similarly, 
the EU incorporated “respect for minorities” into its constitutional 
order in response to charges of hypocrisy. The conditionality 
framework therefore shows how the internal and external competences 
of a federal government can influence one another, illuminating 
whether bold demands upon candidates can lift up the standards for all 
member states. 
However, Reconstruction failed so spectacularly that a 
“Second Reconstruction,” as the Civil Rights Movement is sometimes 
known, was needed to give full effect to the meaning of freedom. This 
Essay concludes by showing how the incongruence between 
readmission conditions and the constitutional framework undermined 
the Reconstruction Amendments. While some scholars have explored 
the influence of the Northwest Ordinance on the Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Amendments,3 none have ever cast this relationship 
between the U.S. federal government’s internal and external 
governance as conditionality, that concept which has come to embody 




2 See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF 
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES, 74–75 (2000). 
3 E.g., Eric Biber, The Price of Admission: Causes, Effects, and Patterns of 
Conditions Imposed on States Entering the Union, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 119 
(2004); George Rutherglen, State Action, Private Action, and the Thirteenth 
Amendment, 94 VA. L. REV. 1367, 1372 (2008).  
4 Professor Ackerman has noted the dearth of legal scholarship on the effect of the 
Reconstruction Act upon the Fourteenth Amendment, though he has not analyzed 
this dynamic as the influence of external conditions on internal governance. See 
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, VOLUME 2: TRANSFORMATIONS 190 (1998). 
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I. CONDITIONALITY DURING EASTERN ENLARGEMENT AND 
AMERICAN RECONSTRUCTION 
 
Like any other club, a federalist system can require conditions 
for membership.5 Each round that the EU negotiated to bring in a 
prospective member, the Union imposed terms for accession. The 
framework for accession lies in Article 49 TEU, a short provision that, 
prior to the fifth enlargement, began, “Any European State which 
respects the values referred to in [ex] Article 6 and is committed to 
promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union.”6 
Because the understanding of the fundamental rights referenced in 
Article 6, now renumbered as Article 2, is constantly changing, no two 
rounds of accession are ever the same.7  
During the fifth enlargement (1993-2004), candidate countries 
had to abide by a set of conditions devised by the European Council 
during a 1993 meeting. These conditions encompassed the criteria of 
“guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect 
for and protection of minorities.”8 While the other criteria had 
appeared in prior rounds of enlargement, the insertion of minority 
protections in the fifth enlargement was entirely new.9 And yet, 
because application for membership in any club is beset by power 
dynamics, the candidates from Central and Southeast Europe 
(“CSEE”) had little choice but to acquiesce—even if accession criteria 
were more exacting than the rules binding current members. For Roma 
rights, the eastern enlargements of 2004, 2007, and 2013 have been 
especially consequential; these rounds marked the first time that the 
EU was willing to use accession conditions to pressure states on Roma 
policies.  
Within the Union, however, the EU did not hold its then-
current members to the same level of scrutiny. Members with sizeable 
Romani populations or thorny minority issues did not draw 
comparable condemnation for treating their minorities badly. In the 
end, of course, the power disparity between the EU and CSEE  
5 Karen E. Smith, The Evolution and Application of EU Membership 
Conditionality, in THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 106 (Marise 
Cremona ed., 2003). 
6 TEU art. 6 (as in effect 1993) (now TEU art. 2). 
7 DIMITRY KOCHENOV, EU ENLARGEMENT AND THE FAILURE OF CONDITIONALITY: 
PRE-ACCESSION CONDITIONALITY IN THE FIELDS OF DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF 
LAW 11 (2007).  
8 See European Union, Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council—
21-22 June 1993 (1993). 
9 Marc Maresceau, Pre-accession, in THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 13 (Marise Cremona ed., 2003). 
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accession candidates required those candidates to accept minority 
protections under the Copenhagen criteria. 
The U.S., too, imposed requirements upon candidates for 
statehood whenever a new state was inducted. For racial equality, the 
most important developments came not during admission of any 
territory as a state, but during the readmission of former Confederate 
states back into the Union after the Civil War. Two of the landmarks 
of racial equality from this era were the Thirteenth and the Fourteenth 
Amendments. Yet federal advocacy of racial equality was not limited 
to Constitutional amendments. During Reconstruction, Congress also 
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which defined citizenship and its 
attendant equal protection rights;10 three separate Reconstruction 
Acts, which divided the South into districts administered by the U.S. 
military and imposed conditions upon the readmission of states 
formerly in rebellion;11 the Enforcement Act 1871, which allowed the 
President to use force to suppress the Ku Klux Klan;12 and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1875, which ensured equal treatment in public 
accommodations.13  
From roughly 1865 to 1870, much of the above legislation 
framed the Union’s conditions for the readmission of Southern states 
and the seating of their representatives. The Reconstruction Act of 
1867, in particular, required that Southern states ratify the Fourteenth 
Amendment.14 Further, the seating of each Southern state’s 
representatives was governed by a separate act of Congress; these acts 
provided for varying degrees of protection of African-American 
suffrage.15 All of these terms comprised the conditionality of Southern 
readmission and representation.  
When the conditionalities of EU accession and American 
Reconstruction are compared, several patterns emerge. 
First it was the top rung of the federalist system—the EU and 
the U.S. federal government—that ushered in the reforms of minority 
rights and racial equality. The 1990s and early 2000s saw the EU 
growing more comfortable with fundamental rights. In the U.S., 
Reconstruction marks the most significant turning point in the nation’s 
federal–state relations, especially in the sphere of racial equality. The 
succession of Constitutional amendments and federal civil rights 
legislation was buttressed (if sporadically) by enforcement measures  
10 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27–30 (1866). 
11 First Reconstruction Act, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428 (1867). 
12 Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). 
13 18 Stat. 335–337 (repealed in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)). 
14 ACKERMAN, supra note 4, at 199–201.  
15 Biber, supra note 3, at 143–44. 
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such as the dispatching of federal troops to quell racial violence in the 
South and the creation of the Freedman’s Bureau to administer the 
post-emancipation transition. These innovations were consistent with 
the defining strategy of EU constitutionalization and Radical 
Republican lawmaking: confer the federal entity jurisdiction and 
enforcement authority by defining certain actions against minority 
groups as infractions of federal law. 
The second pattern emerging from the Reconstruction 
comparison is that the conditions required of aspiring members were 
far more rigorous than the constraints placed upon incumbent 
members. This incongruity is related to the first pattern; for the 
consolidation of power at the federal level gave each union the 
wherewithal to foist bold demands on aspiring members. Hence, the 
EU required minority rights of the East which were being flouted in 
the West. This disjunction became most prominent in 2010, during 
France’s expulsion of Romani populations “back” to Bulgaria and 
Romania, two states that had recently joined the Union. 
Hypocrisy was manifest in the conditions for the readmission 
of the Southern states and the seating of their representatives in 
Congress. The Reconstruction Act of 1867 began by reciting that “no 
legal State governments or adequate protection for life or property 
now exists in the rebel States of Virginia, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Georgia, Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana, Florida.”16 It 
then divided the “rebel States” into five military districts, where 
commanders could deploy a military force to “suppress insurrection, 
disorder, and violence.”17 Rancor toward the Confederacy permeated 
the Act, which reaffirmed the disenfranchisement of Confederate 
soldiers and required senators and representatives to take a loyalty 
oath to the Union—punitive measures that had been circulating in 
Congressional bills for years.18 The denial of suffrage to participants 
in rebellion stood in stark contrast to the expansion of voting rights for 
African-American men. Finally, the Reconstruction Act of 1867 
mandated ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, passed by 
Congress the prior year. Clearly, none of these stipulations applied to 
the Northern states. 
Third, the comparison of conditionalities teaches that charges 
of hypocrisy may eventually prompt harmonization of internal and  
16 Ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428 (1867). 
17 Id. §§ 1–3. 
18 See, e.g., id. § 5. Disenfranchisement was also provided in Section 2 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See also MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF 
PRINCIPLE: CONGRESSIONAL REPUBLICANS AND RECONSTRUCTION 1863, 214–16 
(1974) [hereinafter LES BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE]. 
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external governance—specifically, by raising the standards of 
minority protection within the federalist system. In the U.S., the 
clearest example is the expansion of voting rights. African-American 
suffrage had long been a point of contention in Congress, where 
Radical Republicans sparred with conservative Republicans over how 
to give full effect to the liberty of emancipated slaves. Yet Congress 
did manage to pass the Reconstruction Act of 1867, which defended 
the ability of African-Americans in Southern states to vote. For the 
next three years, the South had to submit to federal baselines for 
elections even though Northern states were free to disenfranchise 
African-Americans. All the while, pressure mounted for a federal 
solution to take care of the disparity once and for all—a solution that, 
as Radicals and moderates converged, took the form of a 
Constitutional amendment. It took some time and much political 
wrangling for this effort to take off, but eventually Congress drafted—
and in 1870 the requisite number of states ratified—the Fifteenth 
Amendment to guarantee universal suffrage. 
As for the EU, the double standards between internal and 
external governance ultimately propelled the adoption of a Union-
wide Charter of Fundamental Rights. Commentators observed that 
minority protections were more onerous under pre-accession 
documents than under EU treaties.19 One episode did more than 
anything else to catalyze reform of this discrepancy: Austria’s election 
of Jörg Haider’s far-right Freedom Party to a governing coalition in 
1999.20 Here was a bout of xenophobia in an incumbent member state 
that challenged the EU’s projection of itself as a defender minority 
protections. In response to the Haider affair, the EU commissioned a 
report on the Austrian impasse that recommended three major changes 
which were ultimately adopted: a change to Article 7 TEU to suspend 
certain rights if a member engaged in a “series and persistent” breach 
of fundamental rights; the creation of a new human rights agency; and 
incorporation of a “bill of rights” into the EU treaties.21 The Charter 
of Fundamental Rights was drafted as a response to the third charge. 
Though the Charter does not expressly address minority rights, it was 
given effect by the Lisbon Treaty, which added “rights of persons 
belonging to minorities” to the EU’s list of founding values.22 Finally,  
19 See, e.g., Editorial, Fundamental Rights and EU Membership: Do As I Say, Not 
As I Do!, 499 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 481, 487 (2012). 
20 See Michael Merlingen et al., The Right and the Righteous? European Norms, 
Domestic Politics and the Sanctions Against Austria, 39 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 
59 (2001). 
21 See id. at 697–99. 
22 See TEU art. 2. 
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it seemed, the time had come to shore up minority protections within 
EU law. 
 
II. THE DILUTION OF CONDITIONALITY 
 
So far, the Roma Rights–Reconstruction comparison has 
suggested that when a federalist system imposes staunch minority 
protections upon prospective members, comparable protections within 
the system’s member states can improve over time. Yet the 
harmonization of conditionality and internal governance is not so 
straightforward, if it happens at all. Sometimes the laws governing 
incumbent members weigh conditionality down; other times, internal 
and external laws meet somewhere in the middle. 
During Reconstruction and the fifth enlargement, both unions 
quickly squandered their advantages over aspiring members. Each did 
so in its own way: the EU misspent the better part of the 1990s through 
inconsistency and ambiguity, while infighting sapped the momentum 
of Reconstruction despite the tail wind of victory from the Civil War. 
In 1993, the European Council presented accession candidates with a 
nebulous mandate of minority protection, which the European 
Commission enforced unevenly. In its 1998 report on Slovakia, for 
example, the Commission noted that Roma suffered discrimination, 
harassment, and lack of police protection; the report then lauded the 
government for approving a “Plan for Solving Romany Problems,” 
before concluding without further analysis that the program has been 
criticized for lack of funding and commitment.23 Similarly in 1999, 
the Commission remarked that Roma in the Czech Republic continued 
to suffer discrimination, prejudice, and lack of police and judicial 
protection; meanwhile, the government had adopted some helpful 
policies and laws, but those measures too were underfunded, 
understaffed, and ineffective.24 Overall, the Commission had no clear 
formulation of what integration looked like—no guidelines to aspire 
toward and no benchmarks to measures progress.25 
If the Commission was inconsistent in its approach, it could at 
least lead the way on conditionality. During Reconstruction, stark 
divisions split the Presidency—and frequently Congress itself. Shortly 
after Andrew Johnson assumed the Presidency, he became a co- 
23 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, REGULAR REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION ON CZECH 
REPUBLIC’S PROGRESS TOWARDS ACCESSION 12 (1998). 
24 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, REGULAR REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION ON CZECH 
REPUBLIC’S PROGRESS TOWARDS ACCESSION 16–17 (1999); 
25 See PETER VERMEERSCH, THE ROMANI MOVEMENT: MINORITY POLITICS & 
ETHNIC MOBILIZATION IN CONTEMPORARY CENTRAL EUROPE 198-99 (2006). 
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conspirator of the recalcitrant South, extending leniency at every turn 
and eventually campaigning as the bulwark against Radical 
Reconstruction.26 Betrayed, the progressive faction of the Republican 
Party assumed control over Reconstruction, shepherding virtually all 
of the legislation identified with the era, often over Johnson’s vetoes.  
As the threat of war receded, Congress assumed control of the 
procedure for admission. This does not mean Congress was unified in 
its approach to Reconstruction; for deep schisms also cut across the 
legislative body. Because Radicals and Democrats were bitter 
antagonists, conservative Republicans played an outsized role in 
legislation. To cajole conservatives into breaking impasses, Radicals 
had to compromise, and so the Reconstruction Amendments almost 
have to be narrowly construed.27 This means that the Thirteenth 
Amendment might have done no more than simply abolished slavery, 
without granting any additional rights;28 that the Fourteenth 
Amendment, as originally conceived, might only have endorsed a few 
basic liberties, rather than broadly prohibiting racial discrimination 
outright;29 and that the Fifteenth Amendment might have required 
only the racially neutral application of voting laws, regardless of 
disparate impacts.30 The shortcomings of each amendment 
necessitated a subsequent amendment—and eventually the Civil 
Rights Movement.  
Thus, laws on racial equality within the Union never matched 
the vigor of demands placed upon territories outside the Union. Even 
if the Reconstruction Act provided a paragon for suffrage, by spelling 
out the voting restrictions that would be prohibited and the voting 
expansions that would be encouraged, when it came time for the 
template to be extended to the entire Union, Congress settled on the 
Fifteenth Amendment, whose final language was watered down from 
the initial proposals.31 The Fifteenth Amendment would foment the 
ire of women suffragists, tolerate Chinese voting prohibitions in the 
West, and confer states the freedom to regulate the “privilege” of 
voting as they saw fit.32 The poll taxes, literacy tests, and other voting  
26 See HEATHER COX RICHARDSON, THE DEATH OF RECONSTRUCTION: RACE, 
LABOR, AND POLITICS IN THE POST-CIVIL WAR NORTH, 1865–1901, 16–17 (2001). 
27 See LES BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 18, at 222, 325–
35. 
28 EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 1863–
1869, 27–28 (1990). 
29 Id. at 96. 
30 Id. at 156. 
31 ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–
1877, 446 (1988). 
32 See id. at 447-49. 
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restrictions that sprang up would endure for nearly a century until the 
federal government definitively intervened again with the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965. 
Nor were new EU members from CSEE on equal footing with 
incumbents in Western and Northern Europe. Despite attaining 
accession in the sixth enlargement in 2007, Bulgaria and Romania 
could not join the Schengen zone of visa-free travel within the EU. 
One of the principal reasons was the fear of influxes of Romani 
migrants.33 
The conditionalities of the U.S. and EU also resembled each 
other how the lofty aspirations of external standards fell prey to 
dissension, sabotage, and lack of conviction. For instance, the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights, which the EU championed in part as redress 
for conditionality’s incongruence, was slow to take effect and rather 
unsatisfactory when it did. The drafters managed to complete the 
Charter quickly, within a year of the Haider affair. Yet because its 
status was intertwined with the Union’s contemporaneous project to 
adopt a Constitutional Treaty, the Treaty’s inability to secure 
ratification cast the status of the Charter into doubt for nearly a 
decade.34 The Charter only entered into force with the Lisbon Treaty 
in 2009. Even then, the Charter did not address minority rights.35  
These results are to be expected, with conditionality pursued 
only halfheartedly and the “bar” for minority rights inside the Unions 
only half-raised. After all, the coalitions that adopted these reforms 
were disparate, and the convergences of interests that held them 
together were narrow and temporary.36 Minority protections under 
conditionality were spurred by the EU’s desire to stabilize its Eastern 
front and, later, to stem the flow of Romani refugees into Western 
Europe and Canada. Once the candidate countries joined, they would 
be subject to the same Treaty obligations as other members; hence, 
even if Western Europe wanted to contain refugee movement, the 
ability to do so was more limited.37  
In the U.S., the conditions imposed upon the reconstructed 
South derived from several interests: to punish the Confederacy,38 to  
33 Tony Todd, France Opposes Border-Free Travel for Romania, Bulgaria, 
FRANCE24, Sept. 30, 2013. 
34 See PAUL CRAIG & GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND 
MATERIALS 393 (5th ed. 2011). 
35 Id. at 395. 36 See Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence 
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980). 
37 EU citizens enjoy freedom of movement and residence within the Union. TFEU 
arts. 20–21. 
38 FONER, supra note 31, at 254. 
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secure Republican votes,39 to limit the movement of African-
Americans into the North,40 and to guarantee rights for emancipated 
slaves.41 These concerns were thought to be resolved by the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which barred Confederates from political 
office and threatened to shrink Congressional representation in the 
event of voter suppression, and the various Reconstruction acts, which 
conditioned readmission on ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and set standards for the treatment of African-Americans. To further 
shore up loyal Republican votes, Congress passed the Fifteenth 
Amendment, expanding suffrage to African-Americans.42 By then, the 
hypocrisy of civil rights was becoming moot—over half the former 
Confederate states had been admitted by 1869, and the rest would soon 
follow. Civil rights could never command Republican attention for 
long; it alienated white voters and split the Republican coalition.43 
With the Fifteenth Amendment’s passage, a fractious and tired 
Republican Party heralded it as a panacea that was to solve the race 
problem at last.44 
Evaluated from the perspective of institutional enforcers, 
conditionality led to unexpected results. The U.S. had federal troops 
at its disposal, while the EU could only punish transgressions by 
withholding, or threatening to withhold, Union membership, technical 
assistance, and funds through programs such as PHARE.45 The fact that 
CSEE adopted the acquis and internalized its norms more readily than 
the American South did federal laws and norms signals a willingness 
on the part of CSEE to join the EU and espouse its vision of Europe. 
The CSEE accession candidates were often led by dissidents from the 
Communist era who were keen to join the EU “club” and adopt all the 
liberal values it represented; the Southern states were merely 
vanquished rebels. Truly, EU accession candidates were supplicants 
and the ex-Confederate states only malcontents. This willingness on 
the part of applicants could overcome even dysfunction in the central 
government to usher in something as unpopular as minority rights.  
If conditionality can succeed on the enthusiasm of applicants, 
then it can fail from their recalcitrance. During Reconstruction, racial 
equality faced resistance from white Southerners, though the 
difference was in degree. In response to the gains of African- 
39 Biber, supra note 3, at 146. 
40 WILLIAM GILLETTE, RETREAT FROM RECONSTRUCTION: 1869–1879, 372 (1979). 
41 FONER, supra note 31, at 256–59. 
42 See RICHARDSON, supra note 26, at 42. 
43 See Michael Les Benedict, The Rout of Radicalism: Republicans and the 
Elections of 1867, 18 CIV. WAR HIS. 334 (1972). 
44 See LES BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 18, at 335–36. 
45 See Maresceau, supra note 9, at 35–36. 
SUBMISSION COPY 5/13/2019  8:16 AM 
10   
 
Americans, whites joined the Klan and other white supremacy groups, 
terrorizing African-Americans and occasionally their Republican 
allies. Today, historians attribute the failure of Reconstruction largely 
to the violence inflicted by white Southerners upon their neighbors.46 
Violence, terror, and exclusion against Romani neighbors also plagued 
CSEE countries when they were accession candidates. Police and 
vigilantes alike killed Roma and burned their homes, while cities built 
walls around Romani neighborhoods–not to mention all the manners 
in which Roma were excluded from participation and representation 
in society. Persecution was severe enough to cause Roma to flee into 
Western Europe and North America to seek asylum.47 Yet until the 
recent crises engulfing Europe, anti-Romanyism generally did not 
translate into organized campaigns or the platforms of major political 
parties.48 In the American South, persecution of African-Americans 
was the way of life under the prior social order; when Reconstruction 
threatened to upend that order, whites resorted to fraud, sabotage, 
violence, and downright insurrection to restore it. 
By itself, the majoritarian impulse to attack minority rights 
does not necessarily doom progress on equality. It is against the 
backdrop of disorganized and lackluster federal (or, in the EU’s case, 
supranational) leadership that local resistance prevails. The 
determination of member state governments plays an important role 
as well. Here the distinction between CSEE and the American South 
was not in degree but in kind. In 1865, none of the newly reconstituted 
Southern state governments reflected popular will, if “popular” be 
measured by the desires of all citizens within the state. In CSEE, 
national governments were cut from an entirely different cloth. They 
legitimately represented their citizens, some political leaders having 
braved incarceration under Communism. These leaders did speak for 
the populace, reflect liberal democratic values, and, even if Romani 
rights were unpopular, side philosophically with human rights. They 
would stand in stark contrast to the governors and lawmakers who 
succeeded the initial batch of Unionists ensconced by Lincoln and 
Johnson; many of these successors had fought for the Confederacy. 
Where CSEE nations in the 1990s were led by artists and dissidents, 
Southern states in the 1870s and onward would be led by 
Confederates, Democrats, and segregationists.  
46 See DOUGLAS R. EGERTON, THE WARS OF RECONSTRUCTION: THE BRIEF, 
VIOLENT HISTORY OF AMERICA'S MOST PROGRESSIVE ERA 19 (2014). 
47 See Sean Rehaag et al., No Refuge: Hungarian Romani Refugee Claimants in 
Canada (2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2588058. 
48 But see Matthew Rhodes, Slovakia after Mečiar, 48 PROB. POST-COMMUNISM 3 
(2001). 
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The evolution of Roma Rights teaches that conditionality can 
be an agent of a federalist system’s constitutional change. At times, 
the disparity in how applicants versus incumbents are treated spurs the 
system to raise the bar for incumbents (thereby lifting the floor); other 
times, this disparity weakens the ambitious mandates placed upon the 
applicants (thereby lowering the ceiling). For the U.S. during 
Reconstruction, the second pattern is more apt. The Union confused 
reconstruction with reconciliation too frequently.49 It would take a 
century and new, external threats for the federal government to move 
past the specter of reconciliation and demand minority protections 
with the same vigor exhibited by the EU toward CSEE states. 
 
 
49 MICHAEL PERMAN, REUNION WITHOUT COMPROMISE: THE SOUTH AND 
RECONSTRUCTION 1856–1868, 7 (1973). 
